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The Adequacy of Compensation for
Patent Infringement-An Analysis




The increasing notoriety during the past two decades of the
large monetary infringement awards1 recovered by United States
patent owners has helped to maintain and foster a positive public
image of an efficient domestic patent system. The general
impression is that our patent laws constitute a well-formulated
instrument to ensure adequate relief against unauthorized and
unlicensed infringement. By and large, that view is accurate. The
relief provided by our current patent statutes, specifically 35 U.S.C.
§§ 283, 284, and 285,2 includes a wide range of remedies, such as
injunctive relief,' damages/costs/interest,4 and attorney fees.5
* Partner, White & Case, New York City; Iona College, B.S. 1965; New York Law
School, I.D. 1968. The assistance of John Scheibeler in the preparation of this article is
gratefully appreciated and acknowledged. This article reflects only the present
considerations and views of the author, which should not be attributed to White & Case
or to any of his or its former or present clients.
1. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass.
1990), amended on reconsideration, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (D. Mass. 1991) (court
awarded $873,158,971); Minolta Settles Suit on Honeywell Patents, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 5,
1992, at D4 (court awarded $127,500,000).
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-285 (1988).
3. "(C]ourts ... may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity
." 35 U.S.C. § 283.
4. "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infingement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs
as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284. The statute also provides that the court may
treble the amount found by the jury or assessed by the court. ME
5. 'The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285.
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Notwithstanding the refinement of these statutory provisions
through many decades of litigation, situations continue to arise in
practice where the monetary relief awarded is clearly inadequate to
compensate the patent holder to the full value of his invention's
contribution.
The present law permits an award of money damages and
"profits" only to the extent of the patent holder's lost profits and
only under certain commercial conditions, e.g., where there are no
non-infringing substitutes. In the absence of these conditions, the
patent holder's only remedy is royalty payments.6 The "Damages"
section of the current patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, has been
judicially construed to limit patent holders who do not themselves
commercially practice their invention to a "reasonable royalty."7
Too many instances have arisen where infringers, secure in the
knowledge that nothing more than a compulsory license at an
established royalty rate will be the price of their infringement, have
deliberately forced the burden and expense of litigation upon patent
owners.
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 284 is the product of several
amendments dating back to the Patent Act of 1870, although the
most significant amendments have been adopted since 1922. In
broad perspective, the amendments over the past seventy years
have sought to ensure that patent holders are awarded the fairest
compensation possible and to ensure that patent holders' ability to
prove the just amount of any award is not encumbered by an
obstructive infringer. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the patent holder is
entitled to recover all damages to compensate for the resulting loss,
not less than a reasonable royalty. The underlying theory of law
applied in patent cases is the general tort theory of compensation,
the goal of which is to render the complainant whole. Baspd upon
the historical evolution of the statute, the patent holder cannot
directly recover any portion of the infringer's profit. While once
permitted, any award based upon the unjust enrichment of the
infringer-even as a deterrent to further wrongful infringement or
6. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
7. Id
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to enable an economically disadvantaged patent holder to share
justly in the profits of wrongful infringement-is no longer an
available form of monetary relief under the present statutory
provisions.
While the language of 35 U.S.C. § 284 otherwise permits a
fairly wide variety of bases for damages recovery, the patent owner
is basically awarded either lost profits or a reasonable royalty,
depending upon the owner's commercial status. As a result, there
have been huge differences in awards. In view of the growing
disparity among certain patent infringement awards, amendments
to 35 U.S.C. § 284, which has been in existence since the 1952
patent statute was enacted, continue to be contemplated in an effort
to ensure just and adequate infingement compensation. These
contemplated amendments seek the return of the remedy of profit
disgorgement. In a proper case, they would permit the recovery of
an equitable portion of infringers' unjust gains.
I. 35 U.S.C. § 284-A HISTORICAL VIEW8
Shortly after the enactment of the Patent Act of 18701 (the
"1870 Act'), the Supreme Court, in the 1876 decision in Birdsall
v. Coolidge," summarized the origins of the 1870 Act pertaining
to a patent owner's remedial rights:
Prior to the passage of the act of the 8th of July, 1870, two
remedies were open to the owner of a patent whose rights
had been infringed, and he had his election between the
two: he might proceed in equity and recover the gains and
profits which the infringer had made by the unlawful use of
his invention, the infringer in such a suit being regarded as
the trustee of the owner of the patent as respects such gains
and profits; or the owner of the patent might sue at law, in
which case he would be entitled to recover, as damages,
8. A detailed analysis of the statutory and Congressional Record history of current
§ 284 is set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp.
500, 514-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
9. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
10. 93 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1876).
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compensation for the pecuniary injury he suffered by the
infringement, without regard to the question whether the
defendant had gained or lost by his unlawful acts-the
measure of damages in such case being not what the
defendants had gained, but what the plaintiff had lost.
The impact of the 1870 Act was to amend the law such that a
patent owner was no longer required to elect between his own
damages and the infringer's profits. Section 55 of the 1870 Act
provided that, upon a finding of infringement, courts were empow-
ered to award, "in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the
defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby.""1
By providing for an award of damages as well as profits (both in
addition to injunctive relief), the 1870 Act afforded the successful
patent owner a clear statutory basis for a double-edged recovery on
the issues of validity and infringement. The balance of equities
tipped clearly in favor of the patent owner and against the infring-
er. Moreover, under section 59 of the 1870 Act, courts further
possessed the discretionary power to increase any damages portion
of a judgment up to three times the amount awarded.1 2 While a
court could increase the amount assessed as the complainant's
damages, its power to treble was specifically limited to the amount
of "the actual damages sustained."' 3 No power, discretionary or
otherwise, was granted under the 1870 Act to increase the amount
ascertained to be the infringer's gains or profits. As such, the
"dichotomy in the 1870 Act between 'the [unjust] profits to be
accounted for by the defendant' and 'the damages the complainant
had sustained' by the [wrongful] infringement was sharply drawn
in language and in consequences."' 4
The remedies provisions of the 1870 Act were not significantly
amended for over forty-five years until the Patent Act of 1922's
(the "1922 Act") focused upon aiding the patent owner with regard
11. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. at 206.
12. Id § 59, 16 Stat. at 207.
13. Id § 59, 16 Stat. at 207.
14. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
15. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392.
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to proof of damages.16 The 1922 Act continued to provide that,
where infringement liability was proven, the plaintiff was entitled
to recover both "the profits to be accounted for by the defendant"
16. Section 4921 of the revised statutes was amended to provide:
The several courts vested withjurisdiction of cases arising under the patent laws
shall have power to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of
courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a decree being rendered in
any such case for an infingement the complainant shall be entitled to recover,
in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the
complainant has sustained thereby, and the court shall assess the same or cause
the same to be assessed under its direction. If on the proofs it shall appear that
the complainant has suffered damage from the infringement or that the
defendant has realized profits therefrom to which the complainant is justly enti-
tied, but that such damages or profits are not susceptible of calculation and
determination with reasonable certainty, the court may, on evidence tending to
establish the same, in its discretion, receive opinion or expert testimony, which
is hereby declared to be competent and admissible, subject to the general rules
of evidence applicable to this character of testimony; and upon such evidence
and all other evidence in the record the court may adjudge and decree the
payment by the defendant to the complainant of a reasonable sum as profits or
general damages for the infingement: Provided, That this provision shall not
affect pending litigation. And the court shall have the same power to increase
such damages, in its discretion, as is given to increase the damages found by
verdicts in actions in the nature of actions of trespass upon the case; but in any
suit or action brought for the infringement of any patent there shall be no
recovery of profits or damages for any infringement committed more than six
years before the filing of the bill of complaint or the issuing of the writ in such
suit or action, and this provision shall apply to existing causes of action. And
it shall be the duty of the clerks of such courts within one month after the filing
of any action, suit, or proceeding arising under the patent laws to give notice
thereof in writing to the Commissioner of Patents, setting forth in order so far
as known the names and addresses of the litigants, names of the inventors, and
the designating number or numbers of the patent or patents upon which the
action, suit, or proceeding has been brought, and in the event any other patent
or patents be subsequently included in the action, suit, or proceeding by
amendment, answer, cross bill, or other pleading, the clerk shall give like notice
thereof to the Commissioner of Patents, and within one month after the decision
is rendered or a decree issued the clerk of the court shall give notice thereof to
the Commissioner of Patents, and it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of
Patents on receipt of such notice forthwith to indorse the same upon the file
wrapper of the said patent or patents and to incorporate the same as a part of
the contents of said file or file wrapper, and for each notice required to be
furnished to the Commissioner of Patents in compliance herewith a fee of 50
cents shall be taxed by the clerk as costs of suit.
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as well as "the damages the complainant has sustained" by the
wrongful infringement.17 The courts' power to treble the amount
of the actual damages awarded was also continued. 8 The 1922
Act made "evidentiary amendments" for determining the amount
of damages.' 9 The amendments brought by section 4921 of the
1922 Act90 provided for an award of "a reasonable sum as profits
or general damages for the infringement" and, for the first time,
permitted "opinion or expert testimony" to be received on the issue
of the quantum of either profits or general damages.2 1 The
legislative intent was to deal with those situations where the
evidence shows that "the complainant has suffered damage from
the infringement or that the defendant has realized profits therefrom
to which the complainant is justly entitled, but that such damages
or profits are not susceptible of calculation and determination with
reasonable certainty."'2
The 1922 evidentiary amendments, which exist to the present
day, are rooted in a longstanding awareness that a patent owner
who painstakingly succeeds in proving infringement often faces
difficulties not of the owner's making in proving the amount of
actual damages or the infringer's profits "with reasonable certain-
ty," as is required by law.23 In the Georgia-Pacific case the trial
court focused upon this very issue:
The line of demarcation, which rules of quality of proof
required to sustain a claim for damages, is between the
speculative and the probable. The reasonably predictable,
not the conjectural, is the standard by which the proof must
be appraised. In an early case, Seymour v. McCormick, [57
U.S. 480] (1853), the court said (p. 490):
"Actual damages must be actually proved, and
17. Id.
18. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 518.
19. Id.
20. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, see. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. at 392.
21. Id.; see Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 518.
22. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. at 392.
23. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, see. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. at 392; Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 518.
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cannot be assumed as a legal inference from any
facts which amount not to actual proof of the fact.
What a patentee 'would have made, if the infringer
had not interfered with his rights,' is a question of
fact and not 'a judgment of law.' The question is
not what speculatively he may have lost, but what
actually he did lose ** *"
Also, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co., [282 U.S. 555, 562-63] (1931), where the court
said:
"The rule which precludes the recovery of
uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages
which are definitely attributable to the wrong and
only uncertain in respect of their amount."
"In such case, while the damages may not be
determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be
enough if the evidence show [sic] the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable infer-
ence, although the result be only approximate".
[sic] 24
The 1946 amendments to the patent statute did not disturb the
stated rules of evidence which permit the use of expert or opinion
evidence.5 The amendments further extended the use of such
evidence to determine "due compensation" in the context of general
damages or a reasonable royalty.2 6 The evidentiary rule was
again carried forward into the 1952 Act.27
While Congress did not draw a distinction between profits and
damages on an evidentiary basis, the distinction in law and equity
between profits and damages was-and remains-clear and distinct.
24. Georgl-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 512.
25. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (applying the evidentiary principles
set out in FED. R. EviD. 702, 703).
26. Id.
27. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 813.
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Although the 1922 Act continued to permit the owner of an
infringed patent to recover an amount equal to the damages he had
sustained plus the defendant's profits,28 it was clear that Congress
did not intend, as an evidentiary matter, to permit a patent owner
to substitute an infringer's profits for the patent holder's actual
damages (as for example, in an effort to obtain an increase of the
monetary award portion of the judgment). 9 The court in Geor-
gia-Pacific noted that "[f]or purposes of the law of damages, the
two concepts are basically different; they cannot be treated as
equivalent."30 Moreover, while the provisions of the 1922 Act
literally continued to authorize a double recovery, judicial interpre-
tation came to bar an award of both the amount of the infringer's
profits and the amount of the patentee's monetary loss as a matter
of fairness and equity.3'
The concept of a "reasonable sum" or royalty to compensate a
patent owner for infringement first appeared in the 1922 Act.32
According to the Act the court was empowered to "adjudge and
decree the payment by the defendant to the complainant of a
reasonable sum as profits or general damages for the infringe-
ment."33 The apparent origin of the concept was a belief that it
provided a flexible and equitable basis upon which to compensate
the patent owner who succeeded in proving infringement but who
would have difficulty proving the amount of damages.34 Even
prior to the enactment of the 1922 Act, however, the concept of a
"reasonable royalty" as a measure of the patent owner's damages
had been developed. 5 In the 1946 amendments to the patent
statute,36 Congress first omitted all reference to the recovery of
28. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, see. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat at 392.
29. Id.
30. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 519.
31. Id.
32. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. at 392.
33. Id.
34. Georgia Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 519.
35. Id.; see Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915);
United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1914).
36. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778. The Act provides:
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent
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the infringer's profits and enacted language providing merely that,
upon a judgment of infringement, the patent owner's recovery shall
be "general damages which shall be due compensation for making,
using, or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royal-
ty."37 In some sense, Congress cured the disease of patent suit
laws shall have power to grant injunctions according to the course and
principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a judgment
being rendered in any case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled
to recover general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using,
or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor, together
with such costs, and interest, as may be fixed by the court. The court may in
its discretion award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party upon the
entry of judgment on any patent case.
The court is hereby authorized to receive expert or opinion evidence upon
which to determine in conjunction with any other evidence in the record, due
compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, and such expert or
opinion evidence is hereby declared to be competent and admissible subject to
the general rules of evidence applicable thereto.
The court shall assess said damages, or cause the same to be assessed,
under its direction and shall have the same power to increase the assessed
damages, in its discretion, as is given to increase the damages found by verdicts
in actions in the nature of actions of trespass upon the case; but recovery shall
not be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the
filing of the complaint in the action. And it shall be the duty of the clerks of
such courts within one month after the filing of any action, suit, or proceeding
arising under the patent laws to give notice thereof in writing to the Commis-
sioner of Patents, setting forth in order so far as known the names and addresses
of the litigants, names of the inventors, and the designating number or numbers
of the patent or patents upon which the action, suit, or proceeding has been
brought, and in the event any other patent or patents be subsequently included
in the action, suit, or proceeding by amendment, answer, cross bill, or other
pleading, the clerk shall give like notice thereof to the Commissioner of Patents,
and within one month after the decision is rendered or a judgment issued the
clerk of the court shall give notice thereof to the Commissioner of Patents, and
it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Patents on receipt of such notice
forthwith to endorse the same upon the file wrapper of the said patent or
patents, and to incorporate the same as a part of the contents of said file or file
wrapper.
This Act shall take effect upon approval and shall apply to pending causes
of action in which the taking of the testimony has not been concluded:
Provided, however, That pending causes of action in which the taking of the
testimony has been concluded are to be governed by the statute in force at the
time of approval of this Act as if such statute had not been amended.
37. H.R. REP. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946); S. REP. No. 1503, 79th
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abuse but killed, the patient of just recovery.38 The court in
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); see Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 528.
38. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 525 n.23 (citing Letter dated Jan. 9,
1929, from Mr. Fish to Mr. Howson, members of the patent bar, read by Conder C.
Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents, before the House Committee on Patents, 1946
House Hearings 2-3 [text of letter available at iU. at 522-23 n.221). Assistant Commis-
sioner Henry went on to give the following testimony:
Now, how has this present act been administered and what has been its
effect on party litigants?
The relief that a patent owner needs against an infringer to protect his
rights in his patent and to compensate him for past infringement is an injunction
to prevent future invasion of his right and damages for past infringeinent. This
the law now accords him in addition to the profits made by the infringer which
are attributable to the unauthorized use and sale of the infinged invention. It
is just at this point, that is, the determination of profits and damages and the
manner of proving the same before masters, that difficulties and injustices arise
in the adjudication of claims for patent infringements.
Frequently a suit for patent infringement involves the infringement of only
an improvement in a complex machine, and it is impossible to apportion profits
due to the improvement. In such circumstances the proceedings before masters,
which are conducted in accordance with highly technical rules and are always
expengive, are often protracted for decades and in many cases result in a
complete failure of justice.
I fully agree with Judge Evan A. Evans, senior judge of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, in his speech before the Patent Law Association in
Pittsburgh, in 1944, when he said, that the rule holding an infringer liable as a
wrongful trustee for the patent owner-is not workable or practicable and is
used by plaintiffs and their counsel to beat and bludgeon a competitor until he,
or it, be exterminated. It is not damages that are sought, but the extermination
of a competitor.
By making it unnecessary to have proceedings before masters and
eliminating the element of profits except as an element of general damages in
patent infringement suits and empowering equity courts to assess general
damages, the measure represents proposed legislation which in my judgment is
long overdue.
Id. at 525 n.23 (quoting testimony of Condor C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of
Patents, before the House Committee on Patents, 1946 House Hearings 7-10). The court
continued:
The legislative history indicates that the most troublesome abuses of the then
existing statute occurred when the infringement was of an improvement patent
on a complex machine. However, as was already noted, Congress seems to
have provided a sweeping resolution to the problem by eliminating the recovery
of profits qua profits in all cases. The statute does not authorize a different
remedy for the owner of an infringed item which was patented and sold as an
entirety, or which provides the entire market value of the article of which it is
a part, than it authorizes for the owner of an improvement patent.
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Georgia-Pacific observed:
It does not seem plausible to argue that Congress sought
by this amendment to expand the definition of damages,
and to expand it so broadly as to incorporate within its
folds what had thitherto been both historically and concep-
tually, a separate standard of recovery, i.e., the infringer's
profits. Even if it be thought that such an expansive
reading can be given to the term "general damages," how
can it be given to the stark "damages" used in section 284
of the 1952 Act which, if anything, seems more narrowly
circumscribed than the 1946 phrasing?
Thus, the conspicuous omission of any mention of
"profits" with regard to ordinary patents in the 1946
amendment and in section 284 of the 1952 Act takes on
heightened significance when compared to the specific
provision for the recovery of profits in the prior patent
statutes and the specific provision for the recovery of
profits in section 35 of the Lanham Act (trademark in-
fringement) and in section 289 of the 1952 codification
(design patent infringement). The ineluctable inference is
that Congress, in 1946, altered the traditional remedy
available to the owner of an infringed ordinary patent. 9
The court's reference in Georgia-Pacific to the Lanham Act
prompts further comment here. The Lanham Act expressly
provides that a "plaintiff shall be entitled, . . . subject to the
principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action."' These provisions are clearly and intentionally cumula-
tive 1 The award of both damages (lost profits) and the infring-
Ia at 525 n.23.
39. Georgia-Pacifc Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 520-21.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988).
41. See Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 997 (M.D. Fla. 1985), modified
on other grounds sub nom., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 995 (11th Cir.
1986).
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er's profits does not amount to an impermissible double recovery.
The two forms of relief in the context of the Lanham Act and
trademark law serve different purposes. The award of plaintiff's
damages serves to compensate plaintiff for "diverted sales or
damage to its reputation, or other harm stemming from unfair
competition."'42 An accounting of defendant's profits properly
serves to deter those who "would wilfully infringe a competitor's
mark." 43  The award of defendant's profits also prevents the
infringer's unjust enrichment. 44
Where the plaintiff proves both that it has suffered actual
damages, including lost sales, and that defendant has profited from
its willful infringement, recovery of both types of damages is
proper.45
The statutory language "damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement," as found in section 284 of the 1952 Act, has
clearly and unequivocally been interpreted and construed, in view
of the legislative history, to mean compensatory damages-i.e., "an
amount, though difficult to ascertain precisely, which indemnifies
the plaintiff for the injury and damage suffered by him. 46
The court in Georgia-Pacific observed that the relevant
legislative history underlying the 1952 Act as currently in force
was "not entirely free of ambiguity"'4 and went on to explain the
following:
In the light of the grave concern expressed in the
legislative history over the problem of apportionment of the
42. Vuitton Et Fils, SA. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. l; accord Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 634, 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
44. W.E. Bassitt Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970).
45. See Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 784 F. Supp. 648, 679-80 (E.D. Mo.
1992) (plaintiff awarded both defendant's profits and plaintiff's actual business damages,
including lost sales); Sun Prods. Group, Inc. v. B & E Sales Co., 700 F. Supp. 366, 386
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (damages for willful trademark infringement assessed in the amount
of three times defendant's profits and twice plaintiff's anticipated profits).
46. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 429
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
47. Georgia-Pacifc Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 521 (citation omitted).
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infringer's profits and the delay and expense which arise
during the ascertainment of profits, and in view of the
specifically expressed purpose of attempting to eliminate
such accountings, it seems clear that the legislature had a
more ambitious goal than the mere elimination of mandato-
ry accountings for profits. This goal was the avoidance of
all, or nearly all, accounting of profits before masters; and
it was to be accomplished by doing away with their basic
raison d'etre, i.e., by eliminating the infringer's profits as
an independent measure of the patent owner's recovery 8
No matter what name the successful patent owner
ultimately applies to his recovery (whether "profits" or
"damages"), if it is to be measured by the amount of the
infringer's profits, it would require the ascertainment of
those profits. This in turn would necessitate an accounting
for profits, whether before a master or before the court,
which would be open to all the criticisms which were
leveled at such proceedings in the testimony before the
House Committee on Patents-the often insuperable
problem of apportioning the infinger's total profits on the
sale of a product between the patented and nonpatented
features, the injustices sometimes visited on infringers on
whom the burden of making the apportionment had fallen,
and the length and expense of the hearings.
It is the court's considered opinion that, under the 1946
amendment and section 284 of the 1952 Act, the patent
owner's sole measure of recovery, other than a reasonable
or established royalty, was to be his lost profits resulting
from the invasion of his patent right. In a case in which
the patent owner is unable to establish, in the conventional
way, the amount of his lost profits, he would be relegated
to the recovery of a reasonable royalty, unless he could
utilize the amount of profits which accrued to the infringer
48. Id at 525-26.
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as an evidentiary factor in ascertaining the amount of his
own lost profits.49
The relative size of an infringer's profits is often an influential
factor in the determination of the amount of a reasonable royal-
ty.50 This is presently the only way in which the infringer's
profits may function factually as an evidentiary element of the
patent owner's damages. The potential inequity of the infringer's
unjust enrichment is now simply ignored because it does not find
judicial or legislative basis in law.
With regard to the issue of the infringer's unjust enrichment,
the trial court in Georgia-Pacific observed:
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is most dramatically
exemplified in those cases dealing with the misappropria-
tion of inventive ideas and trade secrets; that is, cases of
nonpatent torts. In this particular area, common-law
principles control. Illustratively, the measure of damages
has been either quantum meruit for the use value of the
property (Strubbe v. Sonnenschein, 299 F.2d 185, 97
A.L.R.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1962)) or the malefactor's profits
(Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953)). While
the doctrine of unjust enrichment has an ethical appeal and
harmonizes with the modem trend "of enforcing increasing-
ly higher standards of fairness or commercial morality in
trade," 3 Restatement, Torts 540 (1938), the case at bar is
governed by a specific statute and not by general principles
of the common law. The controlling effect of this statute
is emphatically demonstrated by the meaningful legislative
history of the statute which has been directly concerned
with the measure of recovery.5'
The measure of recovery under section 284 of the 1952 Act and
the distinction historically drawn between the patent holder's actual
49. aId at 528-29 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 528; see also Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1952);
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353, 363 (D. Del.
1960), aft'd, 290 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961).
51. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 531.
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damages and the infringer's profits was fully addressed by the
Supreme Court in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co.52 In Aro Manufacturing, the first true judicial
analysis was rendered of the possible function of infringer's profits
to compensate for patent infringement under the 1946 patent statute
amendment or § 284 of the 1952 Act.5
Whatever debate may have raged before Aro Manufacturing as
to the proper role of infinger's profits in compensation under §
284, it was completely put to rest by Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion:
In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is
'profits'; what the owner of the patent loses by such in-
fringement is 'damages."' Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety
Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 f. Profits and damages have
traditionally been all-inclusive as the two basic elements of
recovery. Prior to 1946, the statutory precursor of the
present § 284 allowed recovery of both amounts, reading as
follows:
"Upon a decree being rendered in any such case for
an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to
recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted
for by the defendant, the damages the complainant
has sustained thereby * * *." R.S. § 4921, as
amended, 42 Stat. 392.
By the 1946 amendment, Act of August 1, 1946, c. 726, §
1, 60 Stat. 778, 35 U.S.C. (1946 ed.), §§ 67, 70, the statute
was changed to approximately its present form, whereby
only "damages" are recoverable. The purpose of the
change was precisely to eliminate the recovery of profits as
such and allow recovery of damages only.
"The object of the bill is to make the basis of recov-
ery in patent-infringement suits general damages,
52. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
53. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 531; compare Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Dictograph Prods. Co., 6 F.R.D. 597,599 (D. Del. 1947); Binger v. Unger, 7 F.R.D. 121,
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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that is, any damages the complainant can prove, not
less than a reasonable royalty, together with interest
from the time infringement occurred, rather than
profits and damages." H.R. Rep. No. 1587, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), to accompany H.R. 5311, at
1-2; S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946),
to accompany H.R. 5311, at 2.
There can be no doubt that the amendment succeeded in
effectuating this purpose; it is clear that under the present
statute only damages are recoverable. See, e.g., RicWil Co.
v. E.B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401, 407 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 958 []; Livesay Window Co. v.
Livesay Industries, Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471-472 (C.A. 5th
Cir. 1958); Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F.Supp.
541, 554-555 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1954); Cullen, 28 J. Pat. Off.
Soc. 838 (1946); Wolff, 28 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 877 (1946). 54
II. 35 U.S.C. § 284--THE RULE IN PRACTICE
As outlined in Section I[ and its recount of the relevant history,
patent damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 are awarded solely to
compensate pecuniary losses of the patent holder. The fact that the
infringer may have profited or may have failed to profit from the
infringement is irrelevant."5 As previously discussed, in Aro
Manufacturing the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he
present statutory rule is that only 'damages' may be recovered.
These have been defined by this Court as 'compensation for the
pecuniary loss [the patentee] has suffered from the infringement,
without regard to the question whether the defendant has gained or
lost by his unlawful acts."' 5 6  In determining the patentee's
54. Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 505-06.
55. Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1084 (1985). Note that the court may, however, use an infinger's profits as a
yardstick for approximating the patentee's lost profits. See, e.g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco
Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 655 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
902 (1985).
56. Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
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damages, the primary inquiry must focus under the present law on
what the patent owner would have earned if the infringer had not
infringed 7
Since patent infringement is a tort, the damages law for utility
patents58 has been modified to conform to the general tort law
proposition that damages are intended to compensate and, as such,
the patentee has the burden of proving actual damages to a
reasonable certainty. The courts, in implementing this approach to
patent infringement since 1952, have devised various methods for
determining just and adequate compensation. The preferred manner
of measuring such damages is an award of the patentee's lost
profits.59 If lost profits cannot be proved, the court will award,
as a minimum, what it finds to be a reasonable royalty. Signifi-
cantly, the burden of proof encountered by a patent holder who is
practicing his invention commercially, who is otherwise entitled to
claim lost profits, and who would prove a lost profits claim is
substantial. The statute indicates clearly that an award of damages
is based upon a royalty computation.
A. Entitlement to Lost Profits-A Heavy Burden
Lost profits is an appropriate measurement of damages only
where it can be shown that, "but for" the infringement, the patent
owner would have made the infringing sales and, perhaps, could
have charged higher prices or incurred lower expenses. 0 In
effect, this causation element of a lost profits claim requires a
showing of a two-supplier market, or what economists may refer
to as a "duopoly." Where the patentee has licensed others to sell
57. Id. (citations omitted).
,58. In the special case of infringement of a design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 289, an
infringer may be additionally liable to the patentee for the infringer's total profit. Under
35 U.S.C. § 289 and subsequent case law, when a party infringes a design patent by
selling a product embodying the patented design, the infiinger "shall be liable to the
owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250 ... ." This remedy is in
addition to, rather than exclusive of, the remedies of lost profits and a reasonable royalty.
59. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484 (D.
Mass. 1990).
60. Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the product, it becomes more difficult to prove that the patentee
would have necessarily made the sales had there been no infringe-
ment, and damages are more likely linked to a reasonable royalty.
It is important under 35 U.S.C. § 284, as presently worded, to
focus on compensation for the harm done to the patentee. In Del
Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co.,61 the Federal
Circuit emphasized that:
The general rule for determining the actual damages to a
patentee that is itself producing the patented item, is to
determine the sales and profits lost to the patentee because
of the infringement. Although the statute states that the
damage award shall not be "less than a reasonable royalty,"
35 U.S.C. § 284, the purpose of this alternative is not to
provide a simple accounting method, but to set a floor
below which the courts are not authorized to go.
6 2
Courts have evolved a demanding four-prong test for determin-
ing whether lost profits is an appropriate basis for a damage award.
A patent owner seeking lost profits must prove the following four
elements:63 "(1) a demand for the protected product during the
period of infringing sales; (2) an absence of acceptable, noninfing-
ing substitutes; (3) the patent owner had an ability to meet the
demand for the products covered by the patent; and (4) the amount
of profit the patent owner would have made."' 4  The Federal
Circuit has stressed on numerous occasions, however, that this so-
called Panduit test is not exclusive and that district courts have the
discretion to choose any methodology for assessing and computing
damages.65
61. 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
62. Ia at 1326 (citations omitted).
63. This four-part test was originally articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, CJ., sitting
by designation), and has been approved since then in numerous cases in the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., Ryco Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
64. Ryco Inc., 857 F.2d at 1427.
65. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ('The four part test in Panduit has been approved by this court as one method of
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1. Demand for the Patented Invention
Demand for the patented product can be demonstrated in a
number of ways, most often by simply showing the sales of the
patented product by the patent owner, its licensees, or (most likely)
the infringer. In most cases, the issue of demand is not the subject
of great controversy. For example, in SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Helena Laboratories Corp.,66 the Federal Circuit found that a
substantial number of sales of the infringing slides by defendant
Helena Laboratories was compelling evidence of demand for
SmithKline's patented HEMMOCULT slides.67  Similarly, in
Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,6s the Federal Circuit
determined that the substantial number of sales of infringing
products containing the patented features was compelling evidence
of the demand for the patented product.69
Interestingly, in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries,
Inc.,7 ° the patentee's market share was deemed sufficient evidence
that it would have made at least that percentage of the infringer's
sales if there had been no infringement.7' A reasonable royalty
was then applied to the remainder of the infringer's sales. 2
2. Absence of Acceptable, Noninfringing Substitutes
The most controversial issue surrounding a claim for lost profits
is whether there is an absence of acceptable, noninfringing
substitutes. The patentee seeking lost profits must show that there
calculating lost profits.... These cases recognize that Panduit is, however, not the
exclusive test."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet
Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616 n.* (Fed. Cir.) ("Although this court has accepted
the Panduit standard as a permissible way to establish entitlement to lost profits, we have
not made that standard the exclusive one for determining entitlement to lost profits:),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984) (citations omitted).
66. 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
67. Id at 1165.
68. 735 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
69. Id.
70. 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
71. Id. at 1580.
72. Id at 1580-81.
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are no products available which are noninfringing and which are
acceptable to purchasers such that purchasers could only buy from
either the patentee or the infringer. It then logically follows that
the illicit sales made by the infringer would have been made by the
patentee "but for" the infringement. This analysis is not only a
legal determination, but one very much factually rooted in practical
economic realities. One might interpret "non-infringing" as a
patent law determination, and "acceptable" as an economic
determination.
In the Panduit case, the Sixth Circuit found that "a product
lacking the advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a
substitute 'acceptable' to the customer who wants those advantag-
es."73 Also, in Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. MTD Prod-
ucts, Inc.,74 the Federal Circuit held that substitute wheelbarrows
incorporating some, but not all, of the elements of the patent could
not constitute an acceptable substitute. The court reasoned that the
totality of the wheelbarrow elements and their interaction was
patented and, as such, some lesser assembly could not be regarded
as "acceptable." 75
This "legal" standard for evaluating "acceptable" substitutes has
more recently given way to an "economic" standard. In Smith-
Kline,76 the Federal Circuit, relying upon the evidence adduced at
trial of the "real market" conditions, affirmed the district court's
rejection of arguments for a two-supplier market in view of
significant, acceptable, non-infringing substitutes." The district
court had expressly rejected testimony that there were no accept-
able, non-infringing substitutes as "pure conjecture and as totally
contrary to the great weight of the evidence and the commercial
realities of the marketplace and not credible .... [The SmithKline
expert] ... had no knowledge of marketing."78 In SmithKline, the
73. 575 F.2d at 1162.
74. 788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 1556.
76. 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), affg 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (1.D. Tex.
1989).
77. 926 F.2d at 1166-67.
78. Id. at 1166 (citing the district court opinion, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377).
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Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of a lost
profits claim as the basis for patent damages and found that
significant acceptable non-infinging substitutes existed in the real
marketplace. The patentee argued, apparently based upon prior
Federal Circuit holdings, that the non-infringing products must have
beneficial characteristics of the invention in order to be acceptable.
Chief Judge Nies, writing for the Court, stated that:
[Bly definition, noninfringing products do not represent an
embodiment of the invention. Thus, the district court
properly considered the realities of the marketplace in
connection with an assertion that "but for" the infringing
activities, the patent owner would have made the sales...
. If purchasers are motivated to purchase because of
particular features of a product available only from the
patentee and infringers, products without such features
would obviously not be acceptable noninfringing substi-
tutes. On the other hand, if the realities of the market are
that others would likely have captured sales made by the
infringer, despite a difference in the products, it follows that
the "but for" test is not met. The district court found the
latter was the market situation here.79
3. Patent Owner's Ability to Meet the Demand
This third prong of Panduit, the patentee's ability to meet the
demand, is yet another difficult requirement for lost profits to be
recovered. However, the patentee's "ability" does not necessarily
equate only to having immediate plant capacity.8" This require-
ment of Panduit has been satisfied by a patentee's showing that it
could have subcontracted the work, or by testimony that the
patentee's facilities were adequate or could be made adequate. The
evidence has been held sufficient where the patentee showed that
he bought the product from an outside source, had developed the
market for it, was aggressively protecting that market and intended
79. Id (citations omitted).
80. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1510 (D.
Mass 1990).
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to meet demand even if his supplier failed to meet his contractual
supply obligations.
Thus, the patentee's manufacturing and marketing ability to
meet the demand for the sales made by the infringer involves an
analysis of the patentee's existing capacity, its potential capacity
(by possible expansion and/or subcontracting), and its conversion
capability (from manufacturing other products to the patented
product).
4. Detailed Computation of the Amount of Lost Prof-
its-Price Erosion-Entire Market Value Rule
This fourth Panduit factor involves a detailed, often complex,
analysis of the actual amount, in dollars and cents, of the profits
lost by the patentee due to the infringer's illicit sales. In Del Mar
Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co.,8 ' the Federal Circuit
described the approach to be taken in fixing damages:
The determination of a damage award is not an exact
sdience, ... and "the amount need not be proven with
unerring precision." . . . The trial court is required to
approximate, if necessary, the amounts to which the patent
owner is entitled. "In such case, while the damages may
riot be determined by mere speculation or a guess, it will be
enough if the evidence show[s] the extent of the damages
as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the
result be only approximate.""2
In Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,83
the Federal Circuit held that the profits to which the patentee was
entitled were incremental profits, i.e., those which exclude fixed
costs. As explained by the court:
[This] approach recognizes that it does not cost as much to
produce unit N+1 if the first N (or fewer) units produced
already have paid the fixed costs. Thus, fixed costs-those
81. 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 1327 (citations omitted).
83. 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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costs which do not vary with increases in production, such
as management salaries, property taxes, and insurance-are
excluded when determining profits.84
With such a formula excluding fixed costs, lost profits are easily
increased by huge orders of magnitude.
In addition, if the patentee had to lower its sales price in order
to compete with the infringer, the patentee may be able to recover
for price erosion." While a lost sales claim focuses on the sales
made by the infringer, a price erosion claim focuses on the sales
made by the patentee. The price erosion component of a lost
profits claim is a recovery from the infringer for the measure of
profit lost by the patentee due to the lower prices at which the
patentee was unfairly compelled to sell its patented goods due to
the infringer's illicit presence in the market.
Under the "entire market value rule," a patentee can recover
damages based on the value of an entire product, which comprises
unpatented as well as patented features, as long as the feature
which is patented is essentially the basis for customer demand.86
Under this rule, courts look to the "financial and marketing
dependence on the patented item under standard marketing
procedures" to determine if the unpatented features of a machine
should be included in calculating compensation for infringehent*8 7
For example, in Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines,
Inc.,8 the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's award of
damages based upon the entire price of the infringing amphibious
marsh craft (which had unpatented components), rather than just
the patented pontoon structure.89  Moreover, spare parts and
accessories may also be encompassed within the rule.9" Normally,
84. Id, at 22.
85. See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Cop., 823 F.2d 1538, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Lain, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
86. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986).
87. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
88. 761 F.2d 649 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
89. Id. at 655-56.
90. See, e.g., Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191,1196-97 (D. Mass.
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if the patentee can anticipate the sale of such unpatented-as well
as patented-components, the court will allow damages under the
entire market value rule.
91
C. Reasonable Royalty
Where the patent holder cannot show its lost profits due to
inadequate proof, because it does not itself manufacture the
patented product, or because it licenses under the patent to
nonexclusive licensees, the patent holder is left to an award of a
"reasonable" royalty as a statutory minimum compensation. There
are essentially two accepted and recognized methods to determine
a reasonable royalty: the analytical method and the hypothetical
method.
The analytical method for determining a reasonable royalty is
based upon the infringer's own projections of profits which would
result from the infringing acts. This is indeed difficult to estimate,
because it requires knowledge of the infringer's internal profit
projections and marketing motives.
The hypothetical method is based upon the classic rule that a
reasonable royalty is what a "willing licensor and willing licensee
would have agreed at the time the infringement began." 92 The
courts, however, have more recently recognized that strict adher-
ence to this maxim may lead to injustice. As the Sixth Circuit in
Panduit observed, "the infringer would have nothing to lose, and
everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal,
routine royalty non-infringers might have paid. 93
The hypothetical "willing licensor/licensee" method involves
many factors. The district court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp.,94 enunciated a comprehensive list of
1988) (lost profits awarded for unpatented spare screens especially made for patented
filter device), aff'd in part, 914 F.2d 1473, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
91. King Instrument Corp., 767 F.2d at 865.
92. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
93. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1158.
94. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
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evidentiary factors relevant to determining reasonable royalty:
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing
of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an estab-
lished royalty.
(2) The [royalty] rates paid by the licensee for the use of
other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
(3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or
non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of
territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product
may be sold.
(4) The licensor's established policy and marketing
program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing
others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
(5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same
territory in the same line of business; or whether they are
inventor and promoter.
(6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promot-
ing sales of other products of the licensee; the existing
value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales
of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative
or conveyed sales.
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
(8) The established profitability of the product made
under the patent; its commercial success; and its current
popularity.
(9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over
the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for
working out similar results.
(10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of
the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced
States Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870
(1971).
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by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the
invention.
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that
USe.
(12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that
may be customary in the particular business or in compara-
ble businesses to allow for the use of the invention or
analogous inventions.
(13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished ftom non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
(14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
(15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and
a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon
(at the time the infringement began) if both had been
reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement.95
At one time, if the industry was found to have an established
royalty for the product or a similar product, that was often the sole
basis for determining the reasonable royalty within the meaning of
the statute. The law of patent damages continues to be refined, and
thus in Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,96
the Federal Circuit confirmed its view that an established royalty,
even if found, does not establish a ceilingY In Bio-Rad, the
industry standard was found to be approximately 3-10%, yet a 33%
rate was found to be reasonable.98 Likewise, in Hanson v. Alpine
Valley Ski Area, Inc.,99 evidence of a 2.5% established royalty
was rejected in favor of a reasonable royalty based upon one-third
of the savings experienced by the infringer in using the patented
95. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
96. 739 F.2d 604 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984).
97. Id at 617.
98. Id
99. 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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snowmaking machine.W
The law in this area has really always been that a "reasonable
royalty," while a statutory minimum, is still intended to be a
measure of general damages, i.e., damages which will make the
patentee whole. The Federal Circuit cases make this point
repeatedly. For example, in SmithKline, the patentee argued for a
48% royalty based on the fact that the patented product enjoyed a
50% profit margin. ° ' The court found that argument "not credi-
ble."'02 Defendant Helena, on the other hand, argued for a 3%
rate in view of the established royalty of 3-5% on related pharma-
ceutical products. The district court found 25% as its own just and
reasonable rate, and this was upheld by Federal Circuit:
However, it is undisputed that SKD was an unwilling
licensor, and that it had never licensed the '970 patent
technology... SKD's '970 patent achieved immediate
commercial success .... It satisfied a long felt need...
[and] SKI intended to maintain its exclusivity of the
technology . . . by refusing to grant licenses under the
patent. The district court correctly considered the factors
enumerated in Panduit and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp. [citation omitted], in finding what it
considered a reasonable royalty and Helena has not persuad-
ed this court that the 25% figure "is, in view of all the
evidence, either so outrageously high or so outrageously
low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of a reasonable
royalty. 10
3
In Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co.,'04 the Federal
Circuit held that a single license to a minor competitor at 1%
royalty and two offers at a lower rate to the accused defendant
infringer did not preclude a 15% reasonable royalty finding. 5
100. Id. at 1078, 1080.
101. 926 F.2d at 1163.
102. Id. at 1168.
103. Id. (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick
Co., 895 F.2d 1403, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
104. 710 F.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 1557-58.
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In sum, the district court may reject the extreme figures
proffered by the litigants as incredible and substitute an intermedi-
ate figure as a matter of its judgment from all of the evidence-but
still it will be guided by the rule of general tort damages and not
the infringer's profits.
D. Enhanced Damages
A damage award may be increased up to three times the actual
amount if the infringement is found, by clear and convincing
evidence, to be willful, or if bad faith litigation is shown. 116 The
court will consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the
appropriateness of enhanced damages, including the following
factors: the infringer's knowledge of the patent, the lack of a good
faith effort to design around the patent, and the failure to seek and
obtain an infringement opinion by competent counsel. 7
Enhanced damages are "awarded only as a penalty for an
infringer's increased culpability, namely willful infringement or bad
faith, 0 8 rather than as compensation for the patentee.'09 Thus,
an award of enhanced damages cannot be granted as a means of
bolstering an otherwise inadequate damages award.1 Prejudg-
ment interest is not calculated on an increased portion of an
award.'
III. A PATENT NFRINGER'S UNJUST ENRiCmmm-Thm PATENT
HOLDERS'S SHARE
A. The Reasons that Had Once Counselled Against Awarding
Infringer's Profits as a Relief Basis are No Longer Viable
In the discussion in Section II of this article, it was noted that
106. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
107. See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
108. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
109. Id.
110. IaM at 1580.
111. Id
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there were two driving forces that compelled Congress in the 1946
patent statute amendments to eliminate infringer's profits as a basis
for relief. On the one hand, Congress believed that such a remedy
gave a patentee the ability to squelch competition; on the other
hand, infringer's profits were difficult to prove, particularly where
the invention was merely a part of an overall production device and
the profits had to be apportioned. The Senate Report on the 1946
amendments stated in relevant part as follows:
The object of the bill is to make the basis of recovery
in patent-infringement suits general damages, that is, any
damages the complainant can prove, not less than a reason-
able royalty, together with interest from the time infringe-
ment occurred, rather than profits and damages.
The relief that a patent owner needs against an infringer
to protect his right in his patent and to compensate him for
past infringement is an injunction to prevent future invasion
of his right and general damages as due compensation for
infringing either or any of the rights secured to the patent
owner by his patent. Instead of general damages, Section
4921 of the Revised Statutes now authorizes a complainant
in whose favor a verdict has been rendered in an infringe-
ment suit to recover "in addition to the profits to be
accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complain-
ant has sustained thereby." The evil attendant upon "the
law's delay" and the difficulty of adducing convincing
proof of necessary facts is peculiarly exemplified in patent-
infringement suits where profits are claimed.
Frequently a suit for patent infringement involves the
infringement of only an improvement in a complex ma-
chine, and it is impossible to apportion profits due to the
improvement. In such circumstances the proceedings before
masters, which are conducted in accordance with highly
technical rules and are always expensive, are often protract-
ed for decades and in many cases result in complete failure
of justice.
Although the bill would not preclude the recovery of
profits as an element of general damages, yet by making it
86 FORDHAM ENT, MEDIA & INTELL PROP. LF.
unnecessary to have proceedings before masters and
empowering equity courts to assess general damages
irrespective of profits, the measure represents proposed
legislation which in the judgment of the committee is long
overdue.'12
It is somewhat interesting that the patent laws are in a sense
legally anti-competitive since a "limited monopoly" is permitted to
promote invention. But in a similar sense, the competition which
is forbidden is that which is contrary to law and as such unfair.
The patent laws are essentially a deterrent against unfair competi-
tion. With regard to the first underlying reason for eliminating
recovery of infringer's profits-because this type of recovery
served to squelch competition-it must be observed that the
competition at issue is certainly unfair in nature; the infringer
violates a lawful right of the patentee. The profits wrongfully
obtained can only be thought of in terms of unjust enrichment.
With regard to the relative difficulty of proving the infringer's
profits, and in particular the alleged impossibility of apportioning
profits due to an improvement, the standard of proof has always
been "reasonable certainty." Absolute proof of damages has never
been required. In the face of the prospect of unjust enrichment to
a competitor who is essentially competing unfairly, the logical step
would not have been to eliminate the remedy, but to make the
burden more reasonable to carry. It seems far more sensible to
improve the statute than to eliminate the remedy.
B. Amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 284-A Sensible Solution
The language of the current statute is problematic in that it can
lead to inequitable results where the patent owner is either unable
to prove the four factors of Panduit or is otherwise not entitled to
lost profits. In a recent case,"' the Federal Circuit elaborated on
these inequitable results:
112. S. REP. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C. Cong.
Serv. 1386, 1387.
113. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Historically, the methodology has been problematic as
a mechanism for doing justice to individual, non-manufac-
turing patentees. Because courts routinely denied injunc-
tions to such patentees, infringers could perceive nothinj to
fear but the possibility of a compulsory license at a reason-
able royalty, resulting in some quarters in a lowered respect
for the rights of such patentees and a failure to recognize
the innovation-encouraging social purpose of the patent
system.1
4
A practicing patent owner who cannot prove the Panduit factors
can only expect to recover a royalty which may or may not prove
adequate in the light of the commercial importance of the invention
to the infringer. The basic premise of the patent right is to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention.1 5 That right
is frustrated if an unauthorized party can essentially dictate or
compel a license. An infringer might use the patent owner's
invention in combination with other products and make an
enormous profit with nothing to fear but the possibility of a
compulsory license at a reasonable royalty. In addition, the heavy
and expensive burden and risk of proving lost profits may alone
force the patent owner to accept a reasonable royalty.
Section 284 of 35 U.S.C. should be amended to enable the
patent owner to recover directly that portion of the infringer's
profits which are unjust. While a party entitled to lost profits
should not be permitted to obtain a double recovery, the unjust
profit enrichment of the infringer should be directly recoverable as
the cost of unfair competition, i.e., wrongful infringement, even if
not willful. The award of infringer's profits will serve to deter
further infringement. A more rewarding 35 U.S.C. § 284 can only
encourage further invention.
114. Id. at 1574.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271.

